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2I. Introduction
A. Overview
The theory of Open Innovation is a contemporary management theory which 
teaches that corporations can increase their innovative output by importing ideas from 
outside the firm.  Open Innovation holds much promise, in particular, as a means for 
small innovative companies to collaborate with large, established producers to create 
otherwise impossible radical innovations.  This Paper analyses the role of patent 
protection in fostering these collaborations.  The analysis first examines the 
commercialization and innovation processes and concludes that collaboration is most 
beneficial to both parties when the innovation improves an existing product, yet is from a 
technologically distant field.  In these circumstances, patent protection fails to adequately 
protect the innovator, so alternative means of promoting collaboration must be devised.
B. Motivations
The patent system is at an inherent tension with contemporary practices of 
innovation.  American patent doctrine reveres the lone inventor who, through the 
marshalling of extraordinary insight and experimental toil, conceives a novel invention.  
As a reward, the inventor is given the right to profit from his contribution through 
personal commercial exploitation.  While this perspective may have reflected the practice 
of the mechanical arts at the time of the nation’s founding, it no longer reflects 
contemporary industrial research and development.  Contemporary innovation is a 
networked process.  Ideas are created from the recombination of elements from various 
firms and in various industries.  The construction of enterprises to manufacture new 
3inventions is often beyond the capability of the lone inventor, even with the benefit of the 
patent monopoly.  
This disconnect is evidenced by the fact that contemporary patent doctrine has 
failed to balance the costs and benefits of its intervention in industrial market structures.
Its benefits - an increase in innovative output by American firms - has been on the decline 
in the past decade.  Conversely - its costs - most notably manifest in the rise of 
opportunistic "patent trolls" seeking to exact royalties on unpracticed patents, are on the 
public rise.
These problems arise from the fact that the fundamental premise of the patent 
system - that an in crease in ex-ante incentives to innovate will lead to a correspondingly 
large rise in innovative output - is proving to be flawed.  Modern research suggests that 
innovative output does not rise with a corresponding rise in investment in research and 
development.  Instead, large incentives draw in wasteful rent seekers such as patent trolls, 
who seek to profit from the misplaced incentives given to innovators.
Contemporary management theory has studied for quite some time beneficial 
behaviors and processes which firm can employ to increase their innovative output.  The 
intellectual property regime should shift its focus from tailoring the size of incentives 
offered to tailoring the focus to motivate beneficial innovative behaviors.  This paper 
examines one such theory, the theory of Open Innovation3, and analyzes the role of 
contemporary patent doctrine in supporting firm practices which are consistent with it.
Ultimately finding that patent doctrine fails to provide the proper incentives for 
3 See generally HENRY W. CHSBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING AND 
PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY 43-63 (2003).
4promoting Open Innovation, the paper then suggests several stopgap measures which 
industry can put in place to take advantage of the benefits of the philosophy.
The Open Innovation theory offers a beneficial analytical framework for two 
reasons.  First, through analyzing the innovation process, it teaches a method whereby 
established firms can effectively increase their innovative output.4  Second, by 
demonstrating beneficial interactions between small-firm licensors and established 
producer-licensees, it offers a framework for productive licensing from non-
manufacturing patent holders as an alternative to the wave of destructive “patent trolling” 
prevalent in contemporary industry.
C. Approach
This Paper posits the following analysis:  The theory of open innovation 
advocates that established firms can improve their innovative output by purchasing ideas 
from outside firms.  Third-party innovators will participate in open innovation when 
incumbent firms possess the complimentary assets and customer relationships necessary 
to commercialize their innovation.  Open innovation models best yield breakthroughs 
when innovations from technically distant fields are incorporated into incumbent 
products.  Innovations can only be transferred across such technical distances when 
parties exchange tacit know-how.  Know-how transfer is fraught with risks, which are 
exacerbated by the bargaining power that the incumbent enjoys over the innovator.  The 
innovator, therefore, requires patent protection in order to provide legal leverage over the 
incumbent.  Patent protection weakens when innovations are licensed over technical 
distances because there is a greater likelihood that a blocking patent can be received on 
4
 Innovative output will be employed in this Paper as the metric by which to evaluate performance, and 
corresponds to the frequency of producing radical breakthrough innovations.
5the final product.  Therefore, private, reputation-based, mechanisms are required to foster
breakthrough open innovation systems.
Part II of this Paper discusses the Open Innovation theory and its application in 
industry.  Part III analyzes firm incentives to engage in these practices by analyzing the 
factors which lead a small firm to license, and by utilizing the rubrics of recombinant and 
network innovation theory to analyze what firm practices under Open Innovation lead to 
the most innovative results. Part IV examines the legal and institutional mechanisms of 
intellectual property exchange necessitated by Open Innovation, and identifies the 
tensions that the facilitation of these mechanisms places on intellectual property 
doctrine.  Part V examines the current law, and identifies its shortcomings in supporting 
the advocated industry practices.  Finally, Part VI discusses the implications for patent 
policy and private measures that can be taken by industry to fill this void.
II. The Open Innovation Philosophy
A. The Open Innovation Theory
A contemporary management strategy has significant potential to alter the use of 
patents and other intellectual property in commercializing new technologies.  Countering 
the traditional notion of patent licensing as a tax upon producers, the theory of open 
innovation encourages large firms to actively seek out new technologies from the outside 
as inputs to their research and development programs.5 The philosophy argues that 
changes in the industrial landscape over the past decades require firms to be open to 
5 See id.
6external ideas in order to remain competitive.  Firms must make use of external 
intellectual property as a supplement to, not a replacement for, internal R&D.
Open innovation is a contrast to the traditional, “closed innovation,” model 
employed by the large vertically integrated firms which grew prominent during the 
twentieth century.6  In a closed model, firms perform their own upstream research in 
academic-like corporate campuses, such as Xerox’ PARC.  The output of these
laboratories are then be vetted by the individual business groups for use in their product 
lines.  Technologies which can not find a use are shelved internally.  
Open innovation posits that this model can no longer be successful because the 
growth of alternative models of technology development challenge the competitive 
advantage of integrated R&D7.  The model of large firm funded R&D has been replaced 
by one in which the growth of venture capital financing and employee mobility have 
made possible ideation and commercialization in startup firms.8  Consequentially, ideas 
conceived by large firms will not sit latently but will rather be spun out by their 
inventors.  Furthermore, small firms that focus on process efficiency can buy product 
ideas from outside, and effectively compete with their integrated rivals.
Open innovation therefore advocates that firms open their boundaries to the flow 
of ideas.9  Ideas conceived outside of in-house R&D labs can be purchased for internal 
use.  Likewise, technologies conceived internally, but with no internal application, can be 
licensed to outsiders.  In all cases, technologies must be capitalized on while they are still 
6 See id. at 21-43.
7 See id. at 35.
8 See id. at 36.
9 See id.
7new, as the constant external development of competing technologies renders them 
obsolete.
Although Professor Chesbrough is perhaps the most vocal advocate of the open 
innovation model, similar theories are prevalent in the contemporary literature.  
Management consultancies have recently advocated that companies open up parts of their 
innovation process to outside firms.  Booz-Allen-Hamilton states “Just as best-in-class 
companies manage increasingly extended supply chains, superior innovators are learning 
to outsource segments of the innovation value chain.”10  The Boston Consulting Group 
cites to Joy’s Law, “Assume that innovation will occur elsewhere.”11  Arthur D. Little 
advocates a “co-innovation” alliance structure.12  Trade journals such as Research-
Technology Management have likewise printed articles advocating the adoption of 
integrated external-internal R&D programs.13
Empirical evidence suggests that open innovation models are being adopted in 
some industries.  Outsourced design is common in the electronics industry.  Seventy 
percent of PDA’s are designed by external firms, as well as sixty-five percent of 
notebook PC’s and twenty-percent of mobile phones.14A recent survey shows that a 
majority of firms plan on increasing the volume of in-licensing over the next five years. 15
10
 Alexander Kandybin & Martin Kihn, Raising Your Return on Innovation Investment, BOOZ-ALLEN-
HAMILTON RESILIENCE REP., May 11, 2004, at 10.
11
 Max Blaxill & Kevin Rivette, Acquiring Your Future, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP PERSPECTIVES No. 
409 (2004).
12 See Stefan Odenthal et al., Co-Innovation: Capturing the Innovation Premium for Growth, ARTHUR D. 
LITTLE PRISM, Jan. 2004, at 41-55.
13 See Joseph S. Holmes & Jeffrey T. Glass, Internal R&D – Vital but Only One Piece of the Innovation 
Puzzle, RES.-TECH. MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 2004.
14 See Pete Engardio & Bruce Einhorn, Outsourcing Innovation, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Mar. 21, 2005.
15 See Meagan C. Dietz & Jeffery J. Elton, Getting More from Intellectual Property, MCKINSEY Q., Winter 
2004.
8B. Practical Application: Connect & Develop at Procter & Gamble
One very successful implementation of the open innovation philosophy has been 
at Procter & Gamble.  In 1999, P&G began its Connect & Develop initiative as part of a 
series of programs to retool its innovation process.16  Connect & Develop focused on the 
cross-pollination of ideas both across P&G’s various business groups and with external 
firms.17  By 2004, the program contributed to the launch of several brand extensions and 
a 12% volume growth in P&G’s core brands.18
Connect & Develop was an umbrella for a variety of various knowledge-
brokering activities.19  While a large part of the effort focused on internal knowledge 
management, a significant portion of the program developed a variety of mechanisms for 
external technology acquisition.  The program received considerable support from C.E.O. 
A.G. Lafley20, who made a stated goal of externally sourcing fifty percent of the 
company’s new product ideas by 2007.21  The fifty percent goal was, in the words of 
Lafley, “a metaphor for the fact that we don’t care where the ideas come from.”22
The initiative was a response to increased competitive pressures in the consumer 
products industry which had, by 2000, placed P&G in a serious performance slump.23
The greatest driver was the growing rate of innovation in the industry, which had roughly 
16 See CHESBROUGH, supra note 1, at xxvii.
17 See Nabil Y. Sakkab, Connect & Develop Complements Research & Develop at P&G, 45 RES.-TECH. 
MGMT. 38 (2002).
18 See Patricia Sellers, P&G: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks, FORTUNE, May 31, 2004, at 166. 
(Commenting that very few equally sized companies are able to grow core volume over 10%.)
19 See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
20 See Kenneth Klee, Grand Opening: Procter & Gamble Once Kept R&D Close to the Vest.  Now 
Outlicensing is Driving its Growth, INTELL. PROP. L. & BUS., Feb. 2005 (Quoting Larry Hustson, vice 
president for R&D, innovation, and knowledge as saying “[w]hat’s driving this at P&G is our CEO.”).
21 See id.
22
 Erick Schonfeld, P&G’s Growth Wizard, BUSINESS2.0, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 48 (Quoting C.E.O. A.G. 
Lafley).
23 See Robert D. Hof et al., Building an Idea Factory, BUS. WK., Oct. 11, 2004.
9doubled in the previous decade.24  In the words of one executive, this put pressure on the 
internal R&D program because, “when we make an innovation and bring it into the 
marketplace, it has a much shorter life than it had previously.”25  This was coupled by a 
growing recognition that the level of relevant technical talent was growing – and that 
P&G could benefit by “exploit[ing] the entrepreneurial spirit and the tremendous 
intellectual capability that exists outside the company.”26
P&G faced the challenge of maintaining its integrated, old-line structure while 
becoming a participant in the global research community.  Connect & Develop was 
intentionally not an effort at outsourcing the R&D activities of the firm.27  Nor was it 
going to be implemented by the hiring of external talent – which would contravene the 
firm’s traditional hire-from-school and promote-from-within mentality.28
P&G developed a variety of mechanisms to understand the external research 
environment and to bring ideas into the company.  These programs accessed a variety of 
external innovation sources, spanning from technical consultation to entirely conceived
products.  
At one extreme, P&G actively fostered relationships with academics and outside 
researchers to gain insight into the external technical environment.  The company has 
been working with university researchers since the 1950’s.29  Under Connect & Develop, 
however, it has streamlined the process by focusing on “highly-leveraged nodes,” well-
connected members of the scientific community who have social ties to vast numbers of 
24 Online Extra, At P&G, It’s “360-Degree Innovation,” BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Oct. 11, 2004 (Interview 
with Chief Technology Officer Gilbert Cloyd.).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See Sellers, supra note 18.
28 See id.
29 See Sakkab, supra note 17, at 44.
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researchers.  By leveraging these connections, P&G has been able to “network to the 
external [scientific] world where some of the important research is under way and tie it 
back into our efforts.”30
Similarly, P&G developed an internal staff of experienced technologists titled 
Technology Entrepreneurs.31  The staff actively searched patent data, scientific literature, 
and the internet to identify the state of the external art.  In particular, the group focused
on identifying solutions from unexpected sources for internal problems.
When the “highly-leveraged nodes” of research networks did not exist, P&G has 
worked with external intermediaries to create them.  One example, InnoCentive, 
originally launched by Eli Lilly, is a network of external contract researchers.32  These 
researchers, often scientists and research institutes in areas such as China, Russia, and 
India, bid to solve abstracted technical problems posted on the firm’s web site.33  These 
arrangements are often done for a fee, and with a complete assignment of intellectual 
property rights.
P&G also participates in Yet2.com, an online intellectual property marketplace.34
Both buyer and seller firms post abstracted descriptions of patents, know-how and 
problems to be solved on a searchable on-line database.  When mutual matches are made, 
the parties are introduced and, subsequently, enter into some form of technology 
agreement.
30
 John Teresko, P&G’s Secret: Innovating Innovation, IND. WK., Dec. 1, 2004, at 27 (Quoting P&G Chief 
Technology Officer G. Gil Cloyd.).
31 See Sakkab, supra note 17, at 42.
32 See Gary H. Anthes, Innovation Inside Out, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 13, 2004. P&G also makes use of 
NineSigma, a Cleveland firm which solicits solutions to technical problems posted anonymously, and 
YourEncore, also created by Eli Lilly, which matches retired researchers with contract research problems.
33 See firm website, www.innocentive.com. 
34 See firm website, www.yet2.com.
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While P&G suggests that lone innovators make use of its intermediary services to 
contact the firm35, it has also dealt directly with third party innovators.  In developing its 
new line of products incorporating electromechanical components, such as the Swiffer 
Vac vacuum, P&G needed an entirely novel category of technical expertise.36  The 
company used contract design to access the necessary talent.  C.E.O. Lafley described the 
benefits of the contractual acquisition of external talent:
We have a lot of chemists, a lot of chemical engineers, a lot of 
biochemists.  We aren’t going to go out and hire a lot of electricians and 
mechanical engineers.  We’re going to use people who know how to do 
that, design that, and engineer it.  But we’re going to use our techniques 
for reliability and quality because they apply across manufacturing 
processes.37
Finally, P&G has outright acquired completed product designs from external 
entrepreneurs.  A notable case is the development of the Crest Spinbrush, a low-cost 
electrical toothbrush which has been a commercial success.  The brush was originally 
invented and prototyped by an individual entrepreneur  with the goal of licensing the 
design to a major manufacturer.  The company actively solicits developed external
technologies, looking for “Ready-to-Go” technologies, products, and packaging.38
The Connect & Develop program has been a considerable success at P&G.  By 
2004, 35% of new product ideas were externally sourced, up from 10% in 2000.39 It has 
lead to the introduction of many new products, increasing the product hit rate from 70% 
35 See PROCTER & GAMBLE, CONNECT & DEVELOP: CREATING A GLOBAL INNOVATION NETWORK TO 
BETTER SERVE CUSTOMERS 7, (2003) at www.scienceinthebox.com/en_UK/pdf/C_DbrochureFINAL.pdf 
(last accessed April 10, 2005).
36 See Beth Belton, Newsmaker Q&A: Lafley on P&G’s Gadget “Evolution,” BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Jan. 
28, 2005.
37 See id.
38See PROCTER & GAMBLE, supra note 35, at 5.
39 See Teresko, supra note 30.
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to 90%,40 while lowering R&D costs by 20%41.  While other firms may not replicate 
P&G’s success, its experience suggests that there is merit to the open innovation 
philosophy.
III. Theoretical Justifications for Open Innovation
Before examining the role of patents as a mechanism for innovation transfer in 
open innovation, it is necessary to define the forces which drive such transactions.  Any 
arrangement to divide innovative and commercialization activities between two firms 
incurs costs which must be offset by the potential benefits to the parties.  Most 
significantly, such arrangements require the parties to divide the profits of the endeavor
and expose the parties to the risk of moral hazard, most critically manifest in the risk of 
misappropriation of the innovation itself.  These and other transaction costs of innovation 
transfer may alone render transfers unprofitable.
For the innovator, where transfer serves as a means of commercialization, 
innovation transfer is attractive when its innovation can best enhance the performance of 
an existing technology being successfully implemented by an established firm.  For the 
producer, where it serves as a supplement to internal R&D, innovation transfer is a rapid 
and cost effective means of incorporating unfamiliar technologies into existing products.
By examining the incentives for both parties, this section argues that transfers are most 
beneficial when they take place between firms in many disparate fields, and they involve 
commercial activity near the core business of the established producer.
40 See Sellers, supra note 18.  The product hit rate measures the percent of new products which deliver a 
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A. Motivations for the Small-Firm Licensor
Open innovation programs must motivate innovators to contribute to 
incumbents.42  Upon conception of a technological innovation, the innovator is therefore 
faced with a simple choice:  commercialize the innovation itself, or partner with another 
firm. This decision is driven by a confluence of factors, which have, collectively and 
individually, received considerable attention in the literature.43  The most fundamental 
factors are the relation of the technological innovation to a viable business plan, the 
relative distribution of complimentary assets which comprise the value chain linking the 
innovation to the business result, and the competitive response of established producers.  
When taken together, these factors suggest that commercialization through innovation 
transfer is most lucrative when the potential application of the innovation is an 
incremental improvement to a successful product of an established firm.
return above the cost of capital.
41 See At P&G, It’s “360-Degree Innovation,” supra note 24.
42 Although open innovation is often synonymous with open source, the most beneficial innovations likely 
will not emerge from open source practices.  See generally Joel West & Scott Gallagher, Key Challenges of 
Open Innovation: Lessons from Open Source Software 5-6 (Working Paper, May 2004). While open source 
would provide incumbent platforms access to external ideas, the low powered disclosure incentives the 
approach offers presumably exclude the contribution of valuable or costly innovations.  Open source 
disclosure’s primary incentives are personal satisfaction and reputation. See id. (Discussing the intrinsic 
benefit of personal fulfillment and competence signaling as general contributor motivations.). Furthermore 
open source can be effective when there is an established incumbent who occupies a key network node, and 
all suppliers would benefit from the establishment of a competitive standard. See id. (Discussing direct 
utility as another motivator.).  For example, the success of open source operating systems such as Linux is 
arguably driven by an industry-wide desire to unseat Microsoft from its dominance in a key part of the 
software market. In such cases, the positive externalities of open source innovation would serve as 
sufficient incentives to motivate disclosure.  In most cases, however, innovation exchange is motivated 
primarily by the potential to profit directly from the innovation itself.
43 See generally Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, The Product Market and the Market for Ideas: 
Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs, 32 RES. POL’Y 333 (2003); CLAYTON  M. 
CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION 31-71 (2003); David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological 
Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285 
(1986); DAVID J. TEECE, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 91-113 (2000); CHESBROUGH, supra note 1, 
at 63-91, 155-76.
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The conditions surrounding technology commercialization vary greatly because of 
the complex relationship between a technical innovation and an economic benefit.44  The 
relation is best conceptualized as a value chain linking the technical innovation and some 
source of consumer benefit.45  Ultimately, the consumer pays for a product which effects 
some beneficial result for him – it is this benefit which is the ultimate source of economic 
value.46  Conceptually, there is a lot of ground to be covered between the two.  A 
technical innovation is not limited to one commercial embodiment, and is often only on 
of several innovative inputs to a given product.47
The relationship of the customer value proposition and value chain to potential 
competitors determine whether a new technology should be licensed.  The first 
consideration is the value chain, comprised of the complimentary assets required to turn 
the idea into fruition.48  These assets take many forms, from necessary components to 
manufacturing techniques, to brands.  In order to create an economic benefit, these 
resources must be marshaled together with the innovation into one coordinated effort.  
Consequentially, the costs of assembling these resources restrict the ability to develop a 
novel value chain.  
Venture capital has made the financing of such endeavors possible, but recent 
trends favor investments in scaling up small firms which already have shown small scale 
commercial success – firms which have, therefore, already marshaled enough 
complimentary assets for some level of production.  Autonomous assembly of 
44 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 336.
45 See CHESBROUGH, supra note 1, at 63-71.
46 See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 43, at 71-79 (2003). See also Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 346.
47 See TEECE, supra note 43, at 152-53.
48 See Teece, supra note 43.
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complimentary assets may take considerable time, seriously eroding lead time.49
Furthermore, the skills necessary to build the business around a technology are 
considerably different than those required to develop it, and, provided they have the 
inclination to do so, inexperienced inventors may have a difficult time securing venture 
financing without a track record of success.
Existing firms which possess the requisite complimentary assets are likely to be 
competitors to a potential startup firm.50  A second consideration is, therefore, if startup 
commercialization would trigger a competitive response which the startup firm would be 
unable to survive.51  This is very likely when the proposed business proposition lies close 
to that of an established firm.
Established firms generally have commitments to complimentary assets necessary 
to support a given business proposition, and have high incentives to maintain the 
utilization of those assets.  Their potential responses are generally limited by a path 
dependency constrained by their asset commitment and existing knowledge base.52
Consequentially, they are generally constrained to compete along a single technological 
trajectory towards incremental improvements along the established product performance 
dimension.53  In other words, they are highly motivated to maintain their current 
customer base, and to do so through technological innovation which makes their current 
offerings better.54
49 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 336.
50 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 335.
51 See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 43, at 31-65.
52 See Lori Rosenkopf & Paul Almeida, Overcoming Local Search Through Alliances and Mobility, 49 
MGMT. SCI. 751, 751 (2003).
53 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 342.
54 See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 43, at 31-65.
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Innovations which do not lie on that trajectory are less likely to trigger a 
competitive response.  In particular, innovations which either address an unmet need of 
the existing customer base, or meet existing needs which are over served by the 
established players, are likely to disrupt their entrenched business operation.55  In those 
cases, a startup firm may not trigger a competitive response until it has already had time 
to build its own stock of complimentary assets necessary to survive direct competition.
In summary, partnering is generally less attractive than startup commercialization 
because of the need to divide profits and the risk of moral hazard.  However, in many 
cases, partnering provides an avenue for profiting in circumstances which would not 
support the growth of a startup firm.  Two general factors control when startup 
commercialization will be preferred to partnering.  First, established firms have a 
significant advantage when the required commercialization pathway requires 
complimentary assets which they already possess.56 Second, if the new innovation is 
disruptive to the industry, then there is little advantage in partnering.  Therefore, 
commercialization through partnering is beneficial when technical innovation would 
support an incumbent’s existing business model as an improvement to an existing 
product.
B. Recombinant Innovation as a Motivation for the Established Producer
An integrated producer can benefit from external innovations which supplement 
its internal R&D efforts.57 Integrated manufacturers enjoy a significant knowledge 
55 See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 43, at 31-55.
56
 Assuming the startup would otherwise have access to capital.
57 See DOROTHY LEONARD, WELLSPRINGS OF KNOWLEDGE: BUILDING AND SUSTAINING THE SOURCES OF 
INNOVATION 135-75 (1998) (“The activity of importing knowledge starts with identifying gaps in core 
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advantage in their area of operation.  Their operations generate significant volumes of 
knowledge about both their existing products and their existing consumers.58  This 
specific local knowledge is intrinsically superior to comparable knowledge generated 
outside the firm.  
Superior understanding of existing processes does not, however, by itself lead to 
greater innovation.  Recombinant innovation theory teaches that new innovations are 
created by the novel recombination of disparate ideas. It is not the simple volume of 
ideas, but their diversity, which leads to the novelty of new innovations.  This realization 
suggests the need to look beyond the boundaries of any particular firm for inputs to the 
innovative process.  Rationally organized firms have some outer bound as to the technical 
endeavors which they pursue, and are subsequently constrained in the variety of ideas 
which exist within their bounds.59  Entrenched product and manufacturing platforms, a 
key to competitive success vis à  vis new entrants also serve as a psychological restriction, 
constraining the scope of research and development which a firm can consider.60  The 
limitation of technical expertise to familiar areas further constrains the scope of potential 
solutions.61
Established producers will in-license innovations when doing so would increase 
their innovative output.  By combining the intellectual assets of two separate R&D 
efforts, open innovation systems hold the potential to create radical new products which 
capabilities . . . Such gaps may arise for many reasons, three of the most important of which are (1) a 
deliberate corporate policy to lessen internal research, (2) sizable advances or discontinuities in a given 
technology, or (3) newly identified opportunities for technology fusion.”).
58 See Bernard Guilhon, Markets for Knowledge: Problem, Scope and Economic Implications, 13 ECON. 
INNOVATION & NEW. TECH. 165, 173 (2004).
59 See generally id. at 173.
60 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 338 (Discussing the potential to preserve existing rent generation 
pathways tied to complimentary assets.).
61 See supra text accompanying notes 78-84.
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would otherwise not be conceived.  In contrast to patent doctrine’s traditional search for a 
“flash of creative genius,”62 modern theories argue that innovation is not a random 
process.  Rather, the related theories of recombinant innovation, technology brokering, 
and network innovation all describe innovation as a process of creating new ideas 
through the combination of existing knowledge and ideas.  The concept of explorative 
search describes the manner in which innovators reach into unfamiliar areas to create 
novel combinations.  Taken together, these theories show that radical breakthrough 
innovations result from the combination of elements from distant fields of technology.
The theory of recombinant innovation posits that all innovations are simply 
combinations of existing ideas.63  Ideas are not spawned autonomously, but are rather the 
result of brining together existing elements in previously unforeseen manners.  The 
recombination could be a novel use of an existing element, or the rearrangement of 
existing elements into new combinations.64  Novelty is expressed through the act of
recombination itself.65
Technology brokering theory extends this reasoning.66  Technical innovations, it 
argues, can stem from the reapplication of existing technologies to new areas and new 
problems.  Technical advances in one field are made, not through the advancement of that 
particular art, but through exploiting advances made in other areas.67  Some of the most 
62 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966).
63 See Lee Fleming, Recombinant Uncertainty in Technological Search, 47 MGMT. SCI. 117, 118-20 
(2001);  Lee Fleming & Olav Sorenson, Science as a Map in Technological Search, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. 
J. 909, 910-912 (2004); Lori Rosenkopf & Paul Almeida, Overcoming Local Search Through Alliances and 
Mobility, 49 MGMT. SCI. 751, 751 (2003); ANDREW HARGADON, HOW BREAKTHROUGHS HAPPEN: THE 
SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT HOW COMPANIES INNOVATE 2-52 (2003).
64 See Fleming, supra note 63, at 118.
65 See id.
66 See Andrew Hargadon & Robert I. Sutton, Technology Brokering and Innovation in a Product 
Development Firm, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 716 (1997); HARGADON, supra note 64, at 12-13.
67 See Fleming, supra note 63, at 119; See also HARGADON, supra note 63, at 12. 
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momentous innovations of all time were made by integrating facilitating advances in 
other fields.68
The import of these theories is best described by Professor Hargadon:
Knowledge is imperfectly shared over time and across people, 
organizations, and industries.  Ideas from one group might solve the 
problems of another, but only if connections between existing problems 
and solutions can be made across the boundaries between them.  When 
such connections are made, existing ideas often appear new and creative 
as they change form, combining with other ideas to meet the needs of 
different users.  These new combinations are objectively new concepts or 
objects because they are built from existing but previously unconnected 
ideas.69
Entire firms have structured their innovative efforts in light of these theories.  The 
design firm IDEO, often studied for its innovative output, uses its technical breadth as a 
means of spawning new ideas.70  The firm actively solicits design work in a wide variety 
of fields, from shampoo-bottles to Amtrak railcars.  After each project, it retains 
components it has seen and conceived in an internal library, to which future engineers 
can turn for inspiration.71
Network innovation theory reaches a similar result.  Network innovation theory 
posits that technological innovations result from the discussion of researchers operating 
in various organizations.72 Knowledge flows across informal social networks.  Networks 
are comprised of a series of generally closed small worlds, whose members share strong 
ties with each other and weaker ties with outsiders.73  While the strong ties facilitate 
information flow, the weak ties hold the promise of innovative output.  Ideas transferred 
68 See id. at 36-46. (Describing the example of Ford’s development of mass production.).
69 See Hargadon, supra note 66, at 716.
70 See HARGADON, supra note 63, at 135-38.
71
 See id. at 147-149.
72 See Walter W. Powell et al., Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of 
Learning in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116 (1996).
73 See HARGADON, supra note 63, at 57-60.
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along weak network ties tend to be more novel.74 Network position impacts the 
performance of any particular innovator.  Individuals who occupy node locations with 
ties to many distant worlds, tend to be the most innovative.
These theories suggest that technology evolves through convergence.  New 
technologies arise from the intersection of previously unconnected fields. Technology 
fusion describes the process whereby entirely new technologies, such as electro-
mechanical manufacturing equipment, were spawned by the integration of different fields 
of art.75  New fields, such as biotechnology and nanotechnology, stem from the 
integration of existing disciplines.76
There are an almost unlimited number of potential recombinations which an 
innovator may pursue.77  The process of finding and trying new technical inputs is often 
referred to as search.78  Search processes are often characterized as either local or 
distant.79 Local searches involve components with which the innovator is familiar. 
Distant searches tap into unfamiliar fields.
Distant search occurs over a conceptual distance.  Technologically distant search 
draws from unfamiliar technical fields.80  Distant search can also occur within the same 
technical field.  Geographically distant search taps into distinct bodies of thinking which 
evolve in different physical loci – cross-pollinating, for example, ideas from disparate 
74 See id. See also Rosenkopf and Almedia, supra note 63,  at 755.
75 See Fumio Kodama, Technology Fusion and the New R&D, HARVARD BUS. REV. July-Aug. 1992, at 70; 
Joe Tidd, Development of Novel Products Through Intraorganizational and Interorganizational Networks: 
The Case of Home Automation, 12 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 307, 309 (1995); LEONARD, supra note 
57, at 148-51.
76 See Sonia E. Miller, Converging Technologies, 2 EMPIRE: THE MAGAZINE OF BUSINESS INNOVATION 28 
(2004).
77 See Fleming, supra note 63, at 119.
78 See Fleming, supra note 63, at 118-21.
79 See Fleming, supra note 63, at 119.  This taxonomy is also often referred to as exploitive or explorative.  
Explorative search is often synonymous with boundary-spanning. 
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enclaves like Route 128 and Silicon Valley.81  Organizationally distant searches tap into 
different solutions which are developed by distinct organizations working in parallel on 
similar problems.82
Distant search produces more unpredictable results.  In local search, the innovator 
learns over time how components interact, and is better able to marshal them to create 
useful results.83  However, over time, the output of local search tends to be incremental.  
The lack of uncertainty in local search limits its potential to generate radical, unexpected, 
innovations.  Therefore, radical innovation is most likely to be generated by 
recombination employing distant search.
Taken together, these theories suggest that breakthrough innovations occur when 
unfamiliar technologies are brought together.84  This is a significant observation because 
it informs a mechanism whereby technology transfer creates, instead of merely 
distributes, value.  A degree of recombination occurs in every open innovation project. 
Innovation does not stop when the commercialization process begins.  Product 
development involves the combination of a number of sources of knowledge and 
experience.85  The technical innovator contributes the novel technology. The producer 
80 See Lori Rosenkopf & Atul Nerkar, Beyond Local Search: Boundary Spanning, Exploration, and Impact 
in the Optical Disk Industry, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 287 (2001); Rosenkopf & Almeida, supra note 63.
81 See Rosenkopf & Almeida, supra note 63, at 752-53.
82 See Rosenkopf & Nerkar, supra note 80, at 288-91.
83 See Fleming, supra note 63, at 120-21.
84 See Rosenkopf and Almedia, supra note 63, at 763. See also Rachelle C. Sampson, R&D Alliances & 
Firm Performance: The Impact of Technological Diversity and Alliance Organization on Innovation at 30. 
(New York University Working Paper, Sept. 2003).
85 See MARCO IANSITI & ROY LEVIEN, THE KEYSTONE ADVANTAGE 175 (2004) (“The process for 
technology integration has at its central objective the fusion of knowledge of exiting operations with the 
knowledge of new possibilities.  This knowledge is often embedded in people and systems scattered across 
the ecosystem, ranging from customers to internal experts, and from external consultants to technology 
suppliers.”).
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contributes technical knowledge about the existing product, pro cess, and market86  New 
knowledge is generated throughout the commercialization process – from 
experimentation to production tooling to user feedback.87 The final commercial product 
is the manifestation of the combination of the innovator’s technological innovation with 
the producer’s experience and knowledge.88
In summary, recombinant innovation and associated theories teach that new 
technologies are generated by combining existing ones.  Explorative search creates novel 
combinations of unrelated elements which may lead to technological breakthroughs.  
Open innovation therefore creates value by fostering the recombination of novel 
technologies with existing products, resulting in the conception of radical new products
which are beyond the ability of any one firm to envision.
IV. The Mechanics of Technology Transfer
There are a wide variety of legal and market mechanisms for acquiring outside 
technologies, running the gamut from acquisitions to patent licensing.89 The mechanism 
used impacts the type of knowledge exchanged between parties, which in turn impacts 
the chances of creating a breakthrough product.  This section first identifies three arm’s-
length mechanisms for technology transfer.  The mechanisms are then analyzed, and it is 
argued that the most effective mode of technology transfer for generating breakthrough 
products requires the exchange of tacit know-how.
86 See Helen L. Smith et al., ‘There are two sides to every story’: Innovation and Collaboration within 
Networks of Large and Small Firms, 20 RES. POL’Y 457, 460 (1991) (Observing that “innovative small 
companies may need to another company’s technological resources to ensure that any development can be 
exploited.”).
87 See DOMINIQUE FORAY, THE ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE 59-64 (2000).
88 See generally Hargadon, supra note 66, at 716-18.
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A. Mechanisms for Technology Transfer
Open innovation can best be realized through arm’s-length transactions.  External 
technology acquisition can be accomplished through either integrated or arm’s-length 
transactions.  Integrated acquisitions are favored when the transaction costs of contractual 
technology exchange are prohibitive.90  However, integrated technology transfer 
frustrates the purpose of the open innovation philosophy.  Innovation networks operate 
through the fluid exchange of knowledge between researchers working in disparate
technical and organizational fields.  Vertical integration would restrict the flexible 
exchange of information, as well as curtail organizational diversity across the network.  
Furthermore, open innovation is attractive because it offers greater innovative output with 
a smaller and more nimble internal R&D staff.  These benefits would not be realized if 
external firms and personnel would need to be added to internal programs to effect 
technology transfer.  
There are, consequentially, three primary modes of arms-length technology 
acquisition.91  The modes vary in amount of knowledge exchanged between parties.  The 
first, passive licensing, involves the least information exchange.  It involves the payment 
of royalties predicated on patent rights, with knowledge exchange limited to patent 
publication.  The second, modular integration, involves greater information exchange.  
The technology buyer communicates an architecture to innovators, who in turn provide 
89 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43,  at 337
90 See Teece, supra note 43; Joanne E. Oxley, Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic 
Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach, 13 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 387, 402 (1997).
91 See generally Guilhon, supra note 58; Deepak Somaya & David J. Teece, Combining Inventions in 
Multi-invention Products: Organizational Choices, Patents, and Public Policy (SSRN Working Paper, Nov. 
2000).
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innovations designed to function across the standard.  Finally, active licensing, the third 
mode, is the most open, in which the innovator transfers tacit know-how to the innovation 
buyer.
Modular and passive-licensing modes offer lower transaction costs than tacit 
know-how exchange.  As will be developed below, however, both modes do so at the cost 
of lower innovative performance.  
B. The Limits of Modularity
Modular design is a very popular method of facilitating collaborative 
development.  There are three general types of modularity: open architectures, 
component-level modularity, and design modularity.  Modular design has significant 
advantages and disadvantages compared to integrated modes. It lowers the transaction 
costs of technology transfer, but, in return, limits the radicalness of the ensuing 
innovations.92
Modularity can be designed into a system, and systemic innovations can be made 
more autonomous through a variety of management mechanisms.93  Any collaborative 
design effort in which the design tasks are partitioned ex-ante is essentially modular.94 In 
particular, modularity is manifest when the resulting technical performance of system is 
decoupled from variations in its components.95 There are three general methods of
modularizing design. 
92 See FORAY, supra note 87, at 67.
93 See Somaya & Teece, supra note 91, at 11.
94 See generally ASHISH ARORA, ANDREA FOSFURI, AND ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, MARKETS FOR 
TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 102-112 (2001).
95 See Fleming & Sorenson, supra note 63, at 912-914.
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First, open architectures are the extreme of modularity.96  The downstream 
component producer publicly disseminates an interface standard to which complimentary 
products can be designed.  Third-party firms then independently manufacture and market 
the components, which are then assembled by the end user.  The key advantage of this 
system is that it motivates a large volume of innovation, thus expanding the capabilities 
of the downstream platform.  IBM personal computers, for example, ultimately prevailed 
over Apple because their open design gave users greater flexibility.97
Open architectures are disadvantaged by the limitations on the downstream 
producer’s ability to earn returns from its contribution to the value chain.  Premium
prices are generated primarily by the network effects of consumer access to external 
innovations.  However, intellectual property protection offers little in the way of 
protection of reverse engineering of the product interface.98  Therefore, the platform 
owner faces a lack of control over upstream component suppliers.
The second level of control is component-level modularity.99  Independent 
suppliers produce custom-designed components which are then assembled into the final 
product.  This organizational mode offers the downstream innovator more control over 
component design, as it is able to rely upon contractual and not just market mechanisms 
to control producers.  Component manufacture offers a medium degree of security to the 
upstream producer – its innovation is transferred in physical form which may be difficult 
to reverse engineer, yet it must invest in tooling to manufacture a product with essentially 
one customer. For example, PortalPlayer, a manufacturer of chips used in Apple’s iPod, 
96 See generally Jae Nahm, Open Architecture and R&D Incentives, 7 J. IND. ECON. 547 (2004).
97 See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 43, at 133.
98 See Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. L. STUD. 615, 618 
(2000).
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faces this risk – with over 80% of its sales going into the iPod, it has both been successful 
enough to warrant an IPO, yet unable to hedge against the risk of its relationship with 
Apple souring.100
Third, designs themselves can be modularized.  A modular design is one which is 
broken into discrete components to be performed by unrelated firms.101 Semiconductor 
design and manufacture is a ready example.  In the late 1980’s standard physical-layout 
rules were promulgated across the industry, which facilitated the transfer of component 
designs between firms.102  Consequentially, many “fabless” firms now focus on design 
engineering, while foundry firms perform the manufacturing engineering necessary to 
create a final product.
Modularization has its benefits and drawbacks.  Modularized design lowers the 
transaction costs of integrating external technologies.  It lowers the need for collaborative 
experimentation and debugging which follow technology integration.103  This in turn 
limits the commitment of parties to one another and facilitates more complete ex-ante 
contracting.104  It facilitates ex-ante valuation of the innovative output by creating an 
expressible and codifiable deliverable.105  It also lowers the amount of information 
exchanged between parties, reducing the hazard of technology misappropriation.  
Despite its advantages, modular design limits the radicalness of ensuing products.  
As Christensen argues, product performance can only be advanced when the design is 
99 See Somaya & Teece, supra note 91, at 5-9.
100 See Robert Levine, Profiting from the iPod Economy, BUSINESS 2.0, Sept. 2004.
101 See ARORA ET AL., supra note 94, at 102-112.
102 See Lee Fleming, Intevis: Brokering the Boundaryless Career, at 3 (Harvard Business School Case 
Study 9-602-148).
103 See Somaya & Teece, supra note 91, at 13.  See generally STEFAN THOMKE, EXPERIMENTATION 
MATTERS 61-73 (2003).
104 See Somaya & Teece, supra note 91, at 13.
105 See id.
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integrated.106  Modularization places a constraint on product design which implicitly 
keeps the design from reaching the frontier of what is technically possible.  
Consequentially, when system performance is inadequate, modular designs will be 
integrated.  At least two factors contribute to this phenomenon.
First, when a technology is modularized, the innovation process becomes 
stratified.  Innovation occurs at the component level, at the recombination level, and at 
the architectural level.107  Individual firms innovate at the component level, and the 
technology transfer process is essentially a recombinant innovation process.  
Architectural innovation, however, becomes impossible once a design is modularized.  
The fundamental architecture around which the product is designed cannot be altered 
once it is communicated without risking the compatibility of the designed components.  
Consequentially, any resulting design it limited to the trajectory of products which 
incorporate the interface.
Likewise, while modularity reduces risk of failure, it also reduces the potential for 
radical results.108  Modularity decouples the two technologies being brought together.  
Independent modification of decoupled components yields generally more predictable 
results.  While such predictability reduces the risk of failure, it also reduces the potential 
for radical breakthroughs by limiting the scope of potential results of combination.
In summary, modularity is a powerful, and popular, mechanism for accessing 
external technologies.  It offers the advantages of both likely technical success and 
106 See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 43, at 128.
107 See Joe Tidd, Development of Novel Products Through Intraorganizational and Interorganizational 
Networks: The Case of Home Automation, 12 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 307, 309 (Arguing that 
innovation occurs at both the component and architectural level).
108 See Lee Fleming, The Dangers of Modularity, HARVARD BUS. REV., Sept. 2001,at 20. See also Lee 
Fleming & Olav Sorenson, Navigating the Technology Landscape of Innovation, SLOAN MGMT. REV., 
Winter 2003, at 15. 
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protection of proprietary knowledge.  However, modular designs’ adherence to 
architectures limits the possibility of breakthrough designs.
C. Active and Passive Licensing
There are two general forms of intellectual property licensing.  Passive licensing 
relies upon the patent system.  The innovator discloses its invention through patent 
publication, and technology buyers are then compelled to pay a royalty to make use of the 
disclosed technology.  The parties often remain at arm’s length and, absent the patent 
disclosure, technical information is often not exchanged between the parties.  Active 
licensing requires a much closer relationship.  The seller transfers its technical knowledge 
directly to the buyer.  An interpersonal dialogue is often required between researchers in 
both firms to ensure that the technology is fully transferred.  While active licensing may 
involve the transfer of patent rights, much of the information exchanged is unpatentable 
know-how.  
Active and passive licensing differ in the form of knowledge exchanged.  
Knowledge is often classified as being either codified or tacit.109  Codified knowledge is 
that which is memorialized in some tangible form, such as writing and drawing.   Tacit 
knowledge, or know-how, is information embodied as skills and experience, which 
resides in the personal knowledge of the parties.  Codified knowledge is much easier to 
transmit and reproduce, whereas know-how can only be transmitted with personal 
communication.  Codified knowledge is potentially patentable, but know-how, which 
cannot be fully captured in written form, can only be protected through trade secrets.
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Radical innovations are more likely when the parties use active licensing.  There 
are several reasons why reliance on codified knowledge exchange hinders recombinant 
innovation.
First, codification cannot capture all of the knowledge necessary to practice an 
innovation.  Much of the knowledge possessed by the innovator is experiential, and all of 
the knowledge which is required to make a novel technology work cannot be perfectly 
memorialized.110 The technology transferee must invest its own time and effort in 
experimentation to learn how to practice a transferred technology.111 Furthermore, some
technologies are so novel that they cannot be codified.  No common language exists by 
which they can be descried.  They may be so novel that there exists significant 
uncertainty around their capabilities and performance which defeats attempts to codify 
contractual requirements.112
Second, codified knowledge loses its meaning when transferred over the great 
conceptual distances crossed in explorative search processes.  Codification schemes are 
context dependent.  Different technical fields have devised their own terminology and 
conventions to facilitate communication.  Even different firms working in the same field 
adopt their own internal codification schemes to speed communication.113  The codified 
109 See, e.g., FORAY, supra note 87, at 71-90; ARORA ET AL., supra note 94, at 95-99.  See generally
Mariano Nieto & Carmen Perez-Cano, The Influence of Knowledge Attributes on Innovation Protection 
Mechanisms, 11 KNOWLEDGE & PROCESS MGMT. 117, 119-20 (2004).
110 See generally FORAY, supra note 87, at 71-90. (Describing the difficulty in memorializing the skills of 
an expert rugbyist.).  See also ARORA ET AL., supra note 94, at 105-09 (Discussing the stickiness of 
technical information.).
111
 The patent doctrine of undue experimentation, for example, illustrates that patent disclosures need not 
perfectly teach the reader how to practice the best mode of an invention without its own experimentation.  
112 See Glenn Hoetker, How Much You Know Versus How Well I Know You: Selecting a Supplier for a 
Technically Innovative Component, 26 STRAT. MGMT. J. 75, 77-78 (2005).
113 See ARORA ET. AL., supra note 94, at 115.
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knowledge used to describe an innovation in one field will not be fully understood to a 
worker in another field.  
This phenomenon has lead to firms’ use of gatekeepers to interface with external 
innovators.114  These gatekeepers serve the role of translating external codified 
knowledge into internal codified forms.115  Gatekeeping can only work, however, when 
the gatekeeper is versed in both codification schemes.  Consequently, firms are limited in 
their ability to assimilate external knowledge to the extent that they have boundary 
spanning individuals articulate in external codification schemes.116  Novel technologies, 
with which they are unfamiliar, are unable to be assimilated in codified form.
Third, the technology buyer may lack the technical ability to understand new
codified knowledge.  More formally, it may lack the requisite absorptive capacity to 
assimilate novel technologies.  Absorptive capacity refers to a firm’s ability to assimilate 
external technological knowledge.117 A firm’s ability to process external knowledge is 
related to its prior knowledge with related technologies.118 Consequentially, when firms 
access unfamiliar technologies, they need closer, tacit, linkages with the provider in order 
to assist in learning and understanding the new technology.
In summary, open innovation works best when parties exchange know-how.  
Codified knowledge exchange is only effective between firms working in similar fields of 
technology.  It is also only effective when dealing with technologies that are relatively 
114 See Tsutomu Harada, Three Steps in Knowledge Communication: The Emergence of Knowledge 
Transformers, 32 RES. POL’Y 1737 (2003).
115 See id. at 1739.
116 See id.
117 See Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning on 
Innovation, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 128 (1990).  See also Rachelle C. Sampson, R&D Alliances & Firm 
Performance: The Impact of Technological Diversity and Alliance Organization on Innovation at 5 (New 
York University Working Paper, Sept. 2003).
118 See Cohen & Levinthal, supra note 117, at 128-29.
31
well understood.  When a technology buyer attempts to assimilate an unfamiliar 
technology, it will require access to the innovator’s skill and experience to do so.
V. The Role of Patent Law
A. Patent-Based Mechanisms for Know-How Exchange
Technology transfer through the exchange of tacit knowledge is a difficult task.  
Such agreements are difficult to specify ex-ante, and difficult to enforce ex-post.  Tacit 
knowledge is hard to measure, making inadequate disclosure and misappropriation
difficult to police.  These problems are exacerbated by the fact that, in open innovation,
the licensor is dealing with an established producer with significant competitive 
advantages.
This section addresses the benefits of using patents to protect know-how transfers.  
A know-how licensor faces two primary hazards.119  The first is the risk of moral hazard 
by the licensee, resulting in either underpayment of royalties or technology 
misappropriation.  Second is the risk that insufficient property rights will lead to a lack of 
bargaining power, and, subsequently, an insufficient contractual allocation of royalties. 
Strong intellectual property protection can ameliorate these risks.  Consequentially, 
patents are beneficial, not for the information that they disclose, but for the leverage they 
provide the know-how licensor.  
119 See Ronald Helm & Martin Kloyer, Controlling Contractual Exchange Risks in R&D Interfirm 
Cooperation: An Empirical Study, 33 RES. POL’Y 1103,1103 (2004) (Considering two risks in joint R&D, 
the risk of obtaining a lower profitability than one’s partner, and the risk of learning less than one’s 
partner.).
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1. Hazards of Transferring Tacit Know-How
Know-how transfer is difficult to perform at arms-length.120  Tacit knowledge 
resides in the licensor’s personnel, and can only be exchanged through direct contact with 
the technical staff of the licensee.  This exchange is costly and rquires investment on the 
part of the licensor in the form of personnel commitment and travel and communication 
costs.  The personal nature of the knowledge makes it impossible to quantify and,
therefore, impossible perfectly to specify ex-ante.121  The seller therefore faces an 
Arrow’s paradox when contracting with the buyer, and the subsequent inefficiency is 
likely to result in underpayment.122
Underpayment is also likely to result from the difficulty in verifying tacit 
knowledge transfer.  Third-party monitoring of interpersonal communications is difficult, 
and, consequentially, legal action is difficult to bring.123  Evaluation of the tacit 
knowledge conferred is qualitative, and cannot be measured through the quantitative 
proxies available for patented or codified knowledge.
These tensions result in what has been observed as a race to learn.124  In such an 
event, both parties attempt to extract as much tacit knowledge from the other’s experts as 
possible, while revealing as little as possible in return.  Unintentional, one-sided 
knowledge flow of technical and commercial secrets are a significant possibility.125
Parties’ concerns about opportunism lead to inadequate disclosure.
120 See Somaya & Teece, supra note 91, at 14-15.
121 See Somaya & Teece, supra note 91, at 17-18; Hoetker, supra note 112, at 119.
122 See generally, James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property 
Rights, and Contracting, 69 REV. ECON. STUD. 513 (2002).
123 See ARORA ET. AL., supra note 94, at 118.
124 See Rikard Larsson et al., The Interorganizatioal Learning Dilemma: Collective Knowledge 
Development in Strategic Alliances, 9 ORG. SCI. 285 (1998); Urs S. Daellenbach & Sally J. Davenport, 
Establishing Trust During the Formation of Technology Alliances, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 187, 188 (2004).
125 See Ronald Helm & Martin Kloyer, Controlling Contractual Exchange Risks in R&D Interfirm 
Cooperation: An Empirical Study, 33 RES. POL’Y 1103, 1105 (2004).
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The licensor also faces a strong risk that the licensee will misappropriate its trade 
secrets.126  Once the trade secrets have been transferred, the licensor loses a significant 
amount of its ability to police the licensee’s behaviors.  It cannot force the licensee to 
forget what it has been taught.  The licensor must, therefore, rely upon intellectual 
property protection to prevent the uncompensated use of its tacit know-how.127
2. Effect of Relative Barraging Positions
Arm’s-length technology transfers are feasible only when the parties are on
sufficiently equal footing that a mutually beneficial deal can be reached.  If the licensor’s 
disadvantage relative to his partner is significant enough, then arms-length transactions 
will be forgone in favor of integrated modes of development.128
In open innovation deals, the technology buyer enjoys the majority of the
bargaining power.  It possesses a majority of the requisite complimentary assets.  It has 
the manufacturing facilities in place, as well as the existing brands and customer 
relationships.  Furthermore, it is contributing its own R&D efforts, and is likely utilizing 
a large amount of its own technical knowledge during product development.  
Further advantage stems from the fact that these assets are general with regard to 
the licensed technology.129  An effective open innovation program will be able to access a 
wide variety of technical inputs.  Unless the licensor’s technology is extraordinarily 
unique or valuable, there are likely to be many other substitutes which would be available 
for incorporation.  Therefore, it must compete against many other technology providers.
126 See ARORA ET. AL., supra note 94, at 118. See also Helm & Kloyer, supra note 125, at 1106 (Discussing 
the risk that the commercialization partner will become a competitor.)
127 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 339.
128 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 342.
129 See Teece, supra note 43, at 289.
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Conversely, the technology seller is likely to face a monopsomy situation.  Its 
technology may be more specialized as to its potential applications. 130 Therefore, the 
number of potential purchasers for the given technology is relatively small.  If, in 
particular, the producer possesses specialized complimentary assets needed for 
commercialization, then it can command significant bargaining power.131
Under these circumstances, the technology buyer is at a considerable bargaining 
advantage.132 The buyer’s complimentary asset advantage can only be offset by the 
seller’s intellectual property position.133  If its position is strong, then it can confer a 
commercial monopoly to the licensee. If its intellectual property protection is weak, then 
it has little of unique value to offer.
B. The Relative Strength of Patent and Trade Secret Protection
Two competing forms of intellectual property protection are available to 
innovators – patents and trade secrets.134  While their policies may align, the legal 
doctrines surrounding patent and trade secret licensing differ significantly.  Patent law is 
created by federal statute, and patent disputes are handled under federal law.  Trade secret 
law is an extension of state contract and tort law and is, consequently, construed in light 
of states’ jurisprudence. 
130 See id.
131 See Frank T. Rothaermel & Charles W. L. Hill, Technological Discontinuities and Complimentary 
Assets: A Longitudinal Study of Industry and Firm Performance, 16 ORG. SCI. 52 (2005).
132 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43 at 338.
133 See e.g.  Rudi Bekkers et al., Intellectual Property Rights, Strategic Technology Agreements and Market 
Structure: The Case of GSM, 31 RES. POL’Y 1141, 1142 (2002) (Discussing the necessity of intellectual 
property rights in obtaining a strategic technology alliance.); See also Somaya & Teece, supra note 98, at 
25.
134 See generally Anthony Arundel, The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy for Appropriation, 30 
RES. POL’Y 611 for an empirical comparison of competing use of patents and trade secrets in industry.
35
Although both systems provide exist to provide incentives for invention,135 the 
protections afforded by patents are generally considered to be significantly stronger.  The 
Supreme Court compared the doctrines as follows:
Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the 
patent law.  While trade secret does not forbid the discovery of the trade 
secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent creation or reverse 
engineering, patent law operates ‘against the world,’ forbidding any use of 
the invention for whatever purpose for a significant length of time.  The 
holder of a trade secret also takes a substantial risk that the secret will be 
passed on to his competitors, by theft or by breach of a confidential 
relationship, in a manner not easily susceptible to proof. . . .Where patent 
law acts as a barrier, trade secret law functions relatively as a sieve.136
Although each state has its own body of trade secret law, many states have 
adopted a derivation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  A comparison of that act to the 
patent statute illuminates the relative weakness of protection that trade secret law 
provides.
Patent law protects a greater scope of activities than trade secret law.  A patent is 
infringed by anyone who “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 
patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the United States any 
patented invention,”137 or who actively induces another to infringe.138  Liability generally 
attaches without regard to the manner in which the infringer developed its technology or 
its knowledge of the patent.139  Conversely, trade secret protection only protects against 
135 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
136 Id. at 489-90.
137
 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2005).
138
 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2005).
139
 In fact, liability is increased if the infringer knew of the patent.  See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
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misappropriation through improper means, such as a “breach or inducement of a breach 
of a duty to maintain secrecy.”140
Unlike patent law, which creates liability against any infringer, trade secret 
liability is only extended to those in privity to the licensor.  Misappropriation liability is 
limited to those who know or have reason to know of the secret nature of the trade 
secret.141  A trade secret licensor has no cause of action to recover for use of its secret by 
third parties if it is made public.
Both patent law and trade secret law offer injunctive relief.  A patent holder can 
get a permanent injunction to “prevent the violation of any right secured by patent.”142 A 
trade secret holder, conversely, can receive an injunction against misappropriation, but 
the relief “shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist.”143  The 
injunction may be extended “an additional reasonable period of time in order to eliminate 
commercial advantage that would be derived from the misappropriation,”144 relief which 
while perhaps helpful when dealing with industrial espionage from a competitor is of 
questionable relevance when the licensor lacks the ability to commercialize the secret on 
its own.
Both doctrines provide damages for lost profits and for a reasonable royalty for 
use of the technology.145  Trade secret law further provides damages for the unjust 
140 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT §1-2 (amended 1985).
141 See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985).
142
 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2005).
143 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT §2 (amended 1985).
144 Id.
145 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2005); UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT §3 (amended 1985).
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enrichment of the misappropriator.146  Damages can be recovered up to six years after 
infringement of a patent, compared to three years for a trade secret.147
The one advantage of trade secret law is the scope of ideas that it protects.  A 
trade secret is any information that “derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known . . . .”148  The definition specifically includes 
“know-how” as protected information.149  Patent protection is, conversely, limited to 
inventions that are useful,150 novel,151 and non-obvious.152  Furthermore, the patent must 
fully disclose in written form everything needed to enable any person skilled in the 
relevant art to make and use the invention, thereby precluding protection for inventions 
embodied in “know-how.”153
C. A Proposed Model of Tacit Technology Transfer
Technology transfer would benefit from both the tacit knowledge exchange 
permitted by trade secrets and the strong legal protection given by patents.  The 
opportunism problem inherent in know-how licensing has been addressed in the 
literature.  Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella have proposed a contractual solution that uses 
the threat of patent-based injunction as a hostage-taking mechanism.154  With the 
additional bargaining power afforded by patent protection, the licensor is able to 
overcome opportunism by the licensee.
146 Id.
147 See 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2005); UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT §6 (amended 1985).
148 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT §1(amended 1985).
149 See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT §1, cmt. (amended 1985).
150 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
151 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2005).
152 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2005).
153 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2005).
154 See ARORA ET AL., supra note 94, at 114-141.
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In their analysis, the author’s cite the high costs of third party verification as the 
greatest source of licensor opportunism.155  At the same time, the authors consider 
empirical evidence that most technology deals are motivated by the desire to access tacit 
know-how – not codified technical information.156  The authors in turn propose a simple 
solution.
The authors consider a license for both patents and trade secrets.  They propose a 
simple contract model in which the licensee makes an initial lump sum payment, 
followed by the transfer of know how, and then one final lump sum payment.157  If the 
licensor shirks its know-how transfer obligation, then the licensee withholds the final 
payment.  If the licensee fails to make the final payment, the licensor can bring a patent 
infringement suit against it.  
The authors support their model with empirical study of Indian technology 
importation deals.158  Their empirical research shows a correlation between patent 
strength and the number of technology deals – suggesting that tacit know-how transfers 
are facilitated by stronger patent rights.159
This model has significant implications for patent policy.160 It suggests that 
patent protection plays a crucial role in the success of know-how licensing. In the open 
155 See id. at 118.
156 See id.
157 See id. at 119.
158 See id. at 125-41.
159 See id. at 139.  See also Anthony Arundel, The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy for 
Appropriation, 30 RES. POL’Y 611 (2001) (Finding that firms engaging in collaborative R&D value patent 
protection over trade secret protection more than those who do not.).
160
 The authors fail to consider the legality of such instruments under the doctrine of patent misuse.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 163-74.
39
innovation context, patent protection protects the tacit knowledge flows necessary for 
breakthrough innovation.161
The traditional conception of patents was as an economic incentive given to the 
innovator, paid for through commercial monopoly.  Patent breadth was a measure of the 
reach of an innovator’s monopoly reward.162 This model suggests that the greatest value 
of patents, conversely, stems from their ability to foster exchange in unpatentable know-
how.  Patent breadth, therefore, is a measure of the distance to which the innovator may 
disseminate its innovation.
1. Legality of Hybrid Patent-Trade Secret Licenses
The license model proposed by Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella raises unique 
issues of legal construction.  It seeks to take advantage of the exclusionary power offered 
by patent law to protect know-how which does not qualify for patent protection.  
Although hybrid licenses are enforceable in the contemporary legal environment, their 
legality implicates several doctrines which have been examined by the courts over the 
past fifty years.
The fundamental purpose of patent law is to “promote the Progress of Science and 
the useful Arts.”163 This end is met through balancing the public disclosure of inventions 
to advance the art with economic rewards paid as an incentive to inventors.  Two 
doctrinal concepts mediate this tension.  First is the notion of the quid pro quo between 
the inventor and the government.  A patent can be conceptualized as an exchange – the 
161 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 349.
162 See generally Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J 
ECON. 113, 114-15 (1990).
163 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 8.
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patentee makes a disclosure of his invention to the public, and is, in return, granted a 
commercial monopoly on what he has disclosed.  A second concept is that of public 
reliance.  The public is encouraged to take advantage of the patent disclosure, 
incorporating the disclosed ideas into novel technologies that do not fall within the metes 
and bounds of the patent claims.  Therefore, the freedom to practice unpatented ideas in 
the public domain is a necessary component of the federal innovation scheme.
Trade secret law also has as one of its goals the promotion of innovation. It does 
so, however, through a different pathway.  In the words of the Supreme Court:  
Trade secret law encourages the development and exploitation of those 
items of lesser or different invention than might be accorded protection 
under the patent laws, but which items still have an important part to play 
in the technological and scientific advancement of the Nation.  Trade 
secret law promotes the sharing of knowledge, and the efficient operation 
of industry, it permits the individual inventor to reap the rewards of his 
labor by contracting with a company large enough to develop and exploit 
it.164
Therefore, while patent law promotes public dissemination, trade secret law promotes 
private dissemination. The public dissemination is better rewarded, however, with a 
patent monopoly.  The two doctrines most readily conflict when the patent monopoly is 
extended to protect the private dissemination of knowledge.
The Supreme Court fleshed out these tensions in a series of holdings during the 
second half of the twentieth century.  In Lear v. Adkins165, the Court considered, inter 
alia, a patent licensee’s obligations to pay royalties on a patent license contract after the 
patent has been held invalid.  The Court held that patent law trumped contract law, and 
that royalties contracted for under the power of a patent monopoly could not be 
164
 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bircon Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
165
 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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compelled if the patent were to later be revoked.166  Similarly, in Bruolette v. Thys167, the 
Supreme Court held that parties could not contract to pay patent royalties past the 
expiration of a patent.  Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats complimented these 
restrictions by holding that a state law which extended intellectual property protection to 
boat hull designs, which were placed in the public domain with the sale of the boats, was 
preempted by patent law’s mandate for the free exchange of unpatentable ideas.168
Aronson v. Quick Point169 carved out a significant distinction for trade secret law.  
The Court considered a license agreement made while the patent was still pending.  The 
contract specified two sets of royalties – one for if the patent were to be granted and a 
lower one if the patent were to be denied.  The patent was rejected, and the licensor 
contested the agreement on the ground of both Lear and Bruolette.  The Court rejected 
those arguments, and held that the royalties were agreed to “in arm’s-length negotiation 
and with no fixed reliance on a patent or probable patent grant.”170
The fundamental difficulty which the Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella model 
faces is its reliance on the bargaining power offered by a patent to compel higher 
royalties on associated know-how.  Although Bruolette prohibits the use of the “leverage 
of the [patent] monopoly”171 to extend the scope of the monopoly grant, Aronson
indicates that trade secrets have an independent value which would command royalties in 
the absence of such an agreement.172  Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the 
166 See id. at 674.
167
 379 U.S. 29 (1965).
168
 489 U.S. 141 (1989).  However, Congress can create novel intellectual property regimes that do conflict 
with patent doctrine.  See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §901-914. 
169
 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
170 Id. at 265.
171
 379 U.S. at 33.
172
 440 U.S. at 266.
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propriety of hybrid patent-trade secret licenses, several circuit courts have.173  The 
licenses are generally permitted when they are coextant with the temporal scope of the 
patent rights.  However, when a hybrid license extends royalty payments after the 
invalidation or expiration of the supporting patents, it is generally struck down.174
VI. Implications for Patent Doctrine and Policy
A. Implications for Patent Policy
This Paper has posited a theory of innovation which places novel tensions upon 
patent doctrine.  So far, the Paper has considered recombinant innovation theory and its 
application to open innovation systems.  Recombinant innovation mandates that the most 
radical innovations are made through the combination of elements brought together from 
a wide variety of technologies.  Tacit knowledge exchange is necessary to overcome the 
uncertainties raised by the needed technology transfer.  Tacit knowledge exchange is, 
however, a poor means of earning royalties.  The ethereal nature of the knowledge, 
coupled with the ex-ante uncertainty of technology development, makes it difficult to 
specify or enforce contracts for its exchange.  The doctrinal limitations on trade secret 
protection often fail to adequately protect tacit knowledge disclosure.  Modular
mechanisms used to minimize tacit knowledge exchange hamper innovative radicalness.  
173 See MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW §15:8 (2004).  
174 See e.g., Baladevon v. Abbott Laboratories, 871 F.Supp 89, 94 (D.Mass 1994) (“When a licensing 
agreement fails to distinguish between patent and non-patent rights in royalty payments, Lear precludes 
enforcement of the contract according to its terms but does not preclude compensation for non-patent 
rights.”); Nordion International v. Medi-Physics, Inc., 1995 WL 519798 *5 (N.D.Il 1995) (Holding that, 
after a patent is held invalid, that, “because [the agreement] does not attribute a specific portion of the 
$1,500,000 to the Technology rather than the Patent, the entire provision is unenforceable. . . . Nonetheless, 
Nordion may be entitled to compensation for the value of the patent.”); Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 517 
F.Supp 52 (S.D.Fl 1981).
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Consequentially, strong patent rights bolster the innovator’s intellectual property 
position, lowering the contractual hazards of tacit knowledge exchange.  
Patent protection is even more necessary in an open innovation environment.  
Open innovation licensees are established producers, with access to the complimentary 
assets and capital necessary to bring the product to fruition.  They enjoy a significant 
bargaining advantage over licensing innovators.  The disclosure of tacit innovations to 
them is not likely to occur absent patent protection.
This analysis mandates that broad and strong patent protection is beneficial in 
cumulative innovation industries because it fosters the disclosure of upstream innovations 
to downstream producers.175  Broad patent protection is required to protect disclosure to 
producers operating in different technical fields.  The producers benefit from being 
exposed to a large and diverse set of technological inputs.
This result is at odds with most contemporary notions of effective patent breadth 
in cumulative innovation industries.176  Heller and Eisenberg’s description of the 
“anticommons” effect in biomedical research is in direct conflict.177  The authors describe 
an anticommons effect where multiple upstream patent holders each have the right to 
exclude later innovators from creating complex products.178  In particular, the authors 
focus on the patenting of upstream research tools in the biotechnology field and the 
privatization of ownership of university research.  The large number of claimants raises 
transaction costs and the risk of hold up.  
175 See ARORA ET AL., supra note 94, at 138-41.
176 See generally Henry Chesbrough, The Sustainability of Technology Markets, 8 J. MGMT. & 
GOVERNANCE 117, 119 (2004) (Discussing the implications of Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella’s hybrid 
patent-trade secret model for optimal patent breadth.).
177 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1998, at 698.
178 Id. at 698.
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Heller and Eisenberg raise a valid criticism of broad patent rights in upstream 
technologies.  Their arguments are, however, distinguishable on several grounds.  First, 
they conceptualize the contribution of intellectual property as a means to “fortify 
incentives to undertake risky research projects.”179  This traditional assumption ignores 
the role of intellectual property in facilitating the controlled dissemination of 
technological information – dissemination which becomes more costly across different 
technical fields.  Second, the authors’ focus on transaction costs does not consider the 
role of strong property rights in lowering transaction costs.  They cite to the high costs of 
coordinating the licensing of a diverse set of rights holders in a diverse set of 
technologies, with a diverse set of interests, under uncertainty as to the value of the final 
product.180  Their focus on the costs of coordinating the large number of transactions that 
broad patent protection would bring ignores the cost reduction it would offer in each 
specific transaction.181  Finally, the authors presuppose that, absent the ability to 
appropriate royalties through licensing, upstream innovations would continue to be 
generated.
Merges and Nelson have similarly argued that, in many cumulative technologies, 
broad patents have stifled technological innovation.182 They cite to broad grants to 
pioneer patents such as the Selden patent on automobile configuration and the Wright 
patent on airplane stabilization which have been documented to stifle innovation.  While 
broad pioneer patent grants may slow innovation, strong rights in other areas of the same 
179 Id. at 698.
180 Id. at 700.
181 See Jonathan N. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imperfect Patent Protection and the 
Network Model of Innovation, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 987, 1029-30 (2000) (Arguing that patent protection 
in the biotechnology industry may lower the transaction costs of technology exchange.).
182 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 839, 884-97 (1990).  Cf. ARORA ET AL., supra note94, at 138-41.
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industries may have benefited innovation.183 For example, while broad patents may have 
hindered the automotive industry in its formative years, weak patent protection has
hindered the industry’s access to innovations from small firms and individuals, such as 
Robert Kearns, from whom Ford famously misappropriated the intermittent windshield 
wiper.184 In other industries, such as radio, where broad patents also created an innovative 
deadlock, strong rights may have been a necessary evil because, as stated by the authors, 
“no one firm had the inventive firepower to develop radio on its own.”185
The traditional arguments against broad patent rights in cumulative innovation 
industries accurately reflect the current industrial situation.  However, the rise of open 
innovation practices creates a novel challenge to the established conception of the role of 
patents in cumulative technology development.  In particular, the theory challenges the 
notion that a technology conceived outside a large firm would be equally likely to be 
conceived within it.
This theoretical conflict can, in part, be resolved by specifying the nature of 
strong patent rights required by the recombinant licensing model.  Recombinant 
innovation does not mandate broad pioneer patent rights.  Rather, it requires breadth in so 
far as it facilitates the application of a patent to products in disparate fields of practice.  
B. The Doctrinal Treatment of Recombined Innovations
Patent law impacts licensing negotiations in two important ways.  First, patent 
breadth dictates the amount of leverage the licensor can wield.  Broad coverage will 
protect know-how disclosure in a wider range of fields.  Ambiguity regarding the scope 
183 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 182, at 888-893.
184 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 338.
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of a patent’s reach under the doctrine of equivalents casts a shadow of an ever-present 
risk of patent infringement over licensing negotiations, even in unclear cases.  Second, a 
heightened inventive step requirement protects the licensor’s intellectual property 
advantage.  If the new product created through the collaboration is itself patentable, then 
the licensee may be able to receive a blocking patent which can be used as a bargaining 
chip to offset the licensor’s patent position.186
Although it reveres individual conception stemming from extraordinary insight, 
patent doctrine is not blind to the recombinant nature of the innovation process.  As Judge 
Learned Hand recognized, the relevant inventive step is measured in the selection of 
elements to recombine:  
[T]he defendant argues that the supposed invention is no more than a 
substitution of materials familiar to the art in the same uses; an 
aggregation of which each part performs what it did before. We may 
concede as much arguendo, for the same may be said of every invention. 
All machines are made up of the same elements; rods, pawls, pitmans, 
journals, toggles, gears, cams, and the like, all acting their parts as they 
always do and always must. All compositions are made of the same 
substances, retaining their fixed chemical properties. But the elements are 
capable of an infinity of permutations, and the selection of that group 
which proves serviceable to a given need may require a high degree of 
originality. It is that act of selection which is the 'invention' and it must be 
beyond the capacity of common-place imagination.187
The legal question is, therefore, what forms of recombination yield patentable results.  
Technology brokering, where a technology in one field is applied to a problem in 
a different one, should not lead to an independently patentable result.  The novelty 
requirement precludes the patenting of a novel application of an existing invention.188  If 
185 See id. at 895.
186 See generally Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation, 
26 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1995); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 126-59 (2004).
187
 B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 21-22, 26 USPQ 288 (2d Cir. 1935).  
188 See 35 U.S.C. §102 (2005).
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a new invention is anticipated, or completely disclosed, by a single item in the prior art, 
then it cannot be patented.189 The recitation of a new intended use for an old product does 
not make a claim to that old product patentable.190  A reference may be from an entirely 
different field of endeavor than that of the claimed invention or may be directed to an 
entirely different problem from the one addressed by the inventor, yet the reference will 
still anticipate if it explicitly or inherently discloses every limitation recited in the 
claims.191  Therefore, mere commercial innovation and bare technology brokering of a 
completed technology will not lead to a patentable result.
The combination of existing elements is governed by the doctrine of obviousness.  
Several factors control whether the recombination of existing elements is patentable.  The 
determination of obviousness is a factual determination which primarily considers (1) the 
scope and content of the prior art, (2) the differences between the art and the claimed 
invention, and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the relevant art.192
There once was a heightened requirement on combination patents. Combinations 
of existing elements were required to show an unforeseen result, or synergism, in order to 
be non-obvious.  The Federal Circuit has since rejected this requirement, and treats 
combination patents just as any other invention:
There is no warrant for judicial classification of patents, whether into 
"combination" patents and some other unnamed and undefined class or 
otherwise. Nor is there warrant for differing treatment or consideration of 
patents based on a judicially devised label. Reference to "combination" 
patents is, moreover, meaningless. Virtually all patents are "combination 
patents", if by that label one intends to describe patents having claims to 
inventions formed of a combination of elements. It is difficult to visualize, 
189 See 35 U.S.C. §102 (2005).
190
 In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir., 1997).
191 Id. at 1478.
192 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).  There is also a secondary consideration of 
indicia of nonobviousness such as commercial success.
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at least in the mechanical-structural arts, a "non-combination" invention, 
i.e., an invention consisting of a single element. Such inventions, if they 
exist, are rare indeed.193
Consequentially, there is no special treatment for combination patents per se.  
Combinations of elements in the same field of art are patentable, so long as there is no 
suggestion in the art to combine the elements.194
Explorative search recombines elements from distant fields.  Patent law only 
considers prior art in fields analogous to the invention when determining obviousness:
[I]f the new use be so nearly analogous to the former one that the 
applicability of the device to its new use would occur to a person of 
ordinary mechanical skill, it is only a case of double use; but if the 
relations between them be remote, and especially if the use of the old 
device produces a new result, it may at least involve an exercise of the 
inventive faculty.195
Consequentially, prior art from different fields is not considered, and if an invention is a 
combination of elements from different fields of art then it is patentable.
There is a two step test to determine if a reference is within the relevant field of 
art.196  The court considers first considers if the art is from the same field of endeavor.197
If not, then it considers if the reference is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem 
with which the inventor is involved.198  A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even 
though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, 
because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commanded itself to an 
inventor’s attention in considering his problem.199 The courts have taken an expansive 
193
 Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
194 See Heidelberge Druckmaschinen v. Hantscho Commercial Products, Inc., 21 F.3d 1068, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 
1994).
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196 See In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  
197 Id. at 659.
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definition of what constituted analogous art.  For example, a hair brush and a tooth brush 
have been found to be from analogous fields of art.200
In summary, the patent systems rewards technical novelty in the recombinant 
process.  Brokering of existing technologies is generally not patentable.  Recombining 
existing elements into new technologies may be.  Local recombination is less likely to be 
sufficiently non-obvious, although explorative search into different fields of art 
frequently is.  
An innovator’s patent position is, therefore, strongest when the licensed 
application of the technology is conceptually similar to what it has practiced.  As the 
application becomes more distant, the act of recombination itself becomes a patentable 
act of innovation, and the licensee may be able to secure blocking patent rights against 
the licensee.  Therefore, in order to motivate the disclosure necessary to facilitate 
explorative recombination, an alternative means of protecting disclosure may be 
necessary.
C. Institutional Mechanisms for Fostering Open Innovation
The previous sections have illuminated the need for strong protection for tacit 
knowledge transfer.  While patent protection can bolster the innovator’s position, its 
effectiveness wanes as the final product grows dissimilar from the patented technology.  
An alternate means of protecting disclosure is, therefore, needed to protect knowledge 
exchange across the distances spanned by the distant search process. Contemporary 
firms practice open innovation even in fields without strong patent protection.  Firms 
would not contribute to open R&D programs absent the ability to command some 
200 See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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adequate degree of return.  Private mechanisms have evolved to protect the bargaining 
position of innovation contributors.
In many cases, interorganizational trust supersedes formal contractual and 
intellectual property mechanisms as a facilitator for open knowledge flow.201  Tacit 
knowledge exchange is a uniquely interpersonal process, and is, ultimately, governed by 
the personal feeling of security that participants share.  Know-how exchange is also 
difficult to police: firms can easily under-contribute, under-pay, or over-learn their rivals 
with detection, let alone enforcement, almost impossible.  Absent formal redress, firms 
are likely to underparticipate in transfer activities unless they trust their partners not to 
abuse the relationship.
Trust develops during the formation of a technology exchange partnership.  Many 
technology exchange partners tend to favor working with firms with whom they have 
worked before.  This focus on familiar partners, however, undermines the efficiency of 
the market in ideas, and frustrates the interorganizational distance beneficial to 
recombinant innovation.
Trust is also needed to facilitate the purchase of technology.  Technology 
transfers occur under informational asymmetry, with the seller having a much greater 
understanding of the technology’s value than the buyer.  Disclosure of the information 
necessary to value the technology may expose the technology to misappropriation.  
Consequentially, absent some degree of ex-ante trust between the parties, the technology 
201 See Urs. S. Dallenbach & Sally J. Davenport, Establishing Trust During the Formation of Technology 
Alliances, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 187 (2004); Michael J. Gallivan, Striking a Balance Between Trust and 
Control in a Virtual Organization: A Content Analysis of Open Source Software Case Studies, 11 INFO. 
SYS. J. 277 (2001); Glenn Hoetker, How Much You Know Versus How Well I Know You: Selecting a 
Supplier for a Technically Innovative Component, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 75 (2005).
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buyer may be unable to make an appraisal of the technology, and will subsequently be 
unable to value it for purchase.
Reputation can serve as a proxy for trust.202  If a firm lacks prior dealings with a 
potential partner, it can consult a trusted source to learn of the partner’s history.  
Purchasing firms, whose strong bargaining position may alone deter solicitation of 
partnership by small firms, often must cultivate a reputation for fairness.203  Firms such as 
Cisco Systems and Intel, who rely significantly on external technology acquisition, have 
made institutional efforts to establish a reputation for fair dealing with partners in the 
industry.204
Reputation-building can be fostered through the use of third-party intermediaries.  
While individual technology buyers and sellers may not have repeat interactions, 
intermediaries who focus on brokering transactions have sufficient contact with parties to 
evaluate their propensity for fair dealing.  Intermediaries can also mediate know-how 
exchange, serving as a go-between between parties during the early phases of transfer.  
Prior to the rise of vertically integrated R&D at the turn of the century, patent 
attorneys often filled this role, brokering their client’s technologies to potential 
manufacturers.205  More recently, venture capitalists serve this role.206  In addition to the 
financing that they provide parties, their large personal networks often facilitate 
technology transfer deal creation through informal introduction-making.
202 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 343-45 (Discussing reputation-based idea trading.).
203 See id. See also Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1251, 1268-69 (2004) (Discussing the use of industry norms as an alternative to patent protection.).
204 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 343-45.
205 See Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Intermediaries in the U.S. Market for Technology, 
1870-1920 (NBER Working Paper 9017, June 2002).
206 See Gans & Stern, supra note 43, at 344-45.
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A model for formal trusted intermediaries has been proposed by John Wolpert, 
former director of IBM’s Extreme Blue technology incubator.207  He likens innovation 
intermediaries to “innovation headhunters,” who would go between firms, careful to 
protect their technical secrets until trust has been established:
A company might, to take a simple example, entrust an intermediary with 
the details of a particular technology it has developed as well as its need 
for outside capabilities to commercialize it.  The intermediary would then 
share the information with other intermediaries in the hope of finding an 
appropriate partner.  At no point – until a formal disclosure agreement is 
forged, would any of the information be shared with the companies the 
intermediaries represent.  The intermediaries could be trusted to maintain 
confidentiality because it is simply in their business interest: If they ever 
violate the terms of an arrangement, no company would hire them 
again.208
Wolpert has put these ideas into action and has created InnovationXchange, a pilot 
trusted intermediary program in conjunction with the Australian government.209
It is worthy to note that trusted intermediaries are not the only third party 
intermediaries which participate in the open innovation market.  There are several 
different models of intermediation.210  Firms like InnovationXchange serve as trusted 
intermediaries.  Rights aggregation firms take advantage of the anticommons effect in 
industries with overly strong patent rights by assembling patent portfolios from 
individual innovators and, much like ASCAP in the music industry, offering them for 
license.  It is speculated that Intellectual Ventures, a firm founded by ex-Microsoft Chief 
Technology Office Nathan Myhrvoid is engaged in this practice.211  Centralized 
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marketplace firms facilitate knowledge exchange in industries without strong social 
networks, often by serving as a brokerage for technologies of expertise for sale.  
Yet2.com and InnoCentive are examples, serving as both technology and talent 
brokers.212
In summary, intellectual property law offers limited protection to contributors to 
open innovation programs.  There are three avenues of enhancing these protections. The 
courts could extend greater doctrinal protection to patent holders.  Alternatively, the 
legislature could create a novel intellectual property regime to protect collaborative 
researchers.  In the interim, firms can use reputation-based structures as an alternative to 
legal protection.
VII. Conclusion
Innovation is becoming an increasingly networked process.  Recent trends like the 
Bayh-Dole act and venture capital financing have created a rich sea of ideas outside 
traditional integrated research and development departments.  The theory of Open 
Innovation advocates that firms tap into this resource.  This Paper has considered the 
mechanisms by which they can do so.
Open innovation theory teaches that incumbent producers can benefit by 
integrating external innovations into their existing products.  For innovators, 
commercialization by licensing to an open innovation program is lucrative only if the 
manufacturer can offer an established commercial use for the innovation and the 
necessary complimentary assets to realize it.  In these situations, however, the innovator 
is at an extreme bargaining disadvantage.
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Recombinant innovation theory teaches that radical breakthroughs are created 
through the combination of unfamiliar technologies.  Open innovation yields the best 
results, therefore, when it accesses technologies that are very different than existing 
products.  In order to transfer these technologies effectively, the innovator must transfer 
its tacit know-how to the producer.
Know-how transfer can only be legally protected by trade secrets, and is fraught
with hazards.  The innovator, in a weak bargaining position to begin with, is in need of 
greater leverage against its partner than trade secret protection will allow.  Therefore, 
patents are necessary in order to protect the transfer of know-how.
Patent protection is strongest when the final product is most similar to the 
licensed innovation.  However, recombinant innovation theory suggests that 
breakthroughs occur when technologies are licensed across great distances.  Therefore, 
patent protection alone is insufficient to facilitate open innovation systems.  Private 
mechanisms, utilizing repeat interactions and reputation, fill this legal void.
Open innovation may be a prevalent trend in some industries in the near future.  If 
this is so, it will place a novel tension on a patent system traditionally focused on 
rewarding lone inventors.  Although contractual and private mechanisms are being 
developed to foster these transactions, there is significant potential for legal and 
institutional development in this area.
